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CALIBRATING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW 
 According to Greek mythology, the earth and sky conceived Themis (the Titaness 
of divine justice and law). Thereafter, Themis became the second wife of Zeus and gave 
birth to Dike (the goddess of moral order and fair judgment). Dike was thought to be the 
means to justice—of fair judgments and rights established by custom and law—whereas 
Themis was divine justice—justice itself.1 In tribute to the myths, Dike is often depicted 
as holding the scales of justice, the scales based on equal arm beam balances.  
 
 
 
 
Together, as mother and daughter, the two divine conceptions personified justice in the 
realms of both humans and gods, weighing the actions of humans in terms of justice. 
These two conceptions of justice ruled the archaic period of Ancient Greece’s 
understanding of law in a way incomprehensible to modern man, for justice was 																																																								
1 “Dike.” Greek Mythology Wiki. Wikia, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. http://greekmythology.wikia.com/wiki/Dike 	
Picture 01: Within this archaic mechanism, two pans hang from a beam at points equidistant from the 
fulcrum (point of support). Objects were weighed by equalizing the weight with standard weights added 
together. At that moment, equilibrium was reached. 	
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interwoven into every sphere of life. In Ancient Greece, the fulfillment of one’s soul, 
leading one to a virtuous life, was what every man strived for in existence.  
 Within the late archaic period of Ancient Greece, laws transformed into thesmoi: 
they were now structured and established as written words, giving permanence and 
validity to parts of community life reducible to written regulations.2 At this time, dikē’, 
arising from themis, became incorporated into the beginnings of a regulatory structure 
that acted to govern aspects of a community. Though laws were now malleable into text, 
the lofty conception of justice was still present within them. For example, Lycurgus (the 
individual who is historically attributed with composing the first written laws) is said to 
have documented the professions of an oracle from Delphi.3 The judicial system within 
Ancient Greece utilized judges in the same sense as the modern day system does. At this 
time, however, judges were respected and seen as having the presence of the divine 
within them; individuals believed “the administration of justice rests with persons called 
dikaspoloi (‘handlers of dikē’) whom Zeus has entrusted with the guardianship of the 
themistes.4” The godly conceptions of justice from Ancient Greece were almost seen as a 
gift to humans for their use in ordering their societies, analogous to Prometheus’ gift of 
fire to humankind.  
It was not until the classical period of Ancient Greece that written laws, thesmoi, 
became nomoi, written statutes influenced by and imparted to the political and social 
customs. Much like the term “norm” in the modern culture, nomos is described as 																																																								2	Wiener, Philip P. "Law, Ancient Greek Ideas of." Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected 
Pivotal Ideas. Vol. II. New York: Scribner, 1973. 680. Print. 3	Gill, N. S. "Lycurgus Lawgiver of Sparta." About Education. About.com, 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 
2015. 4	Wiener. Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Vol. II. at 675.  	
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consisting of those beliefs widely held but valid only to the extent to which they are 
believed, not scrutinized.5 Through precedence, these actions became so entangled in 
society that they were thought of as its framework; hence, there were no moral principals 
or even rationale to examine. As a result of the adherence to nomoi, laws arising within 
this period were more surface level, less purposeful, and more difficult to rationalize. The 
movement away from the overarching principles within themis became more evident in 
that nomos arose from the “cohesion from the fact that it is, or ought to be, generally 
regarded as valid and binding by the members of the group of which it prevails.6” 
Within the classical period of Anicent Greece, it was as if dikē became corrupted by 
the notions found within nomoi. The fulcrum on the scale of justice, ultimately holding 
the pans equidistantly apart, was beginning to crumble as the emphasis on themis was 
lessened. Without this fulcrum keeping the pans equidistantly apart, the subsequent 
weights of items cannot accurately be determined. The actions of humans within this 
period could not be accurately examined through the lens of law without themis 
balancing the methodology of law. Hence, laws within this period became a product of a 
culture, not the means to justice and harmony within a culture. Since laws became the 
unscrutinized products of the culture, the end to which they served was left to the 
determination of those with the power to influence culture.  
This detachment from themis and adherence to nomoi seen in the Classical Period of 
Ancient Greece influenced Roman law, as evidenced through the Roman Era’s focus on 
material and public welfare instead of the conceptions of law. At this time, laws focused 
on contracts, property, easements, corporations, partnerships, and injuries—many 																																																								5	Id at 682.		6	Id at 684. 
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concepts evident in the Western legal system today.7 It is important to note that the focus 
on public welfare was only to a superficial level: for example, “there was no theory that it 
was the duty of the state to furnish social security or to establish a system of socialized 
medicine…the state did not provide education for children.8” Furthermore, though the 
law was focused to an extent on human rights and protecting the freedom of men, such 
was validated under unarticulated Hobbesian notions that humans cannot live peacefully 
together under natural law. The justification of law became a self-defense, a caveat of 
humans living with one another, instead of something that flourishes from the human 
existence.  It was in this mistrust of human nature that Roman law was created by the 
state, and, in accordance with the Christian emphasis, it was said to be “the powers that 
are ordained of God,” that were needed to mitigate and “protect good men from the 
wicked.9”  
Even though the conception of the purpose of law changed within these times, 
judges acting as overseers of law within the judicial system were still seen and revered as 
the only individuals who “should always be aware of their high duty; they should be 
impartial, never acting as judges in matters that concerned their own interests, always 
following the rules of reason and equity rather than the letter of law.10” Though the 
backdrop upon which law was set in the Roman Era differed from the Ancient Greeks, 
the role of Roman judges was similar to the dikaspoloi, carrying the notions of dikē’ with 
them, with an emphasis on reason and equity instead of the morality quality in themis.  
																																																								7	"Law in Ancient Rome." Law in Ancient Rome, The Twelve Tables - Crystalinks. Crystalinks, n.d. Web. 
17 Dec. 2015. <http://www.crystalinks.com/romelaw.html>. 8	Wiener. Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Vol. II. at 687.  9	Id at 687-8. 10	Id.	
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The Roman perspective on law has largely remained prevalent in the Western world, 
with the separation of church and state further separating the use of morality within 
judgments of law (though many laws still followed today were influenced by this 
perspective). In modern times, the perspective and studies in law largely shifted to 
isolated parts of dikē’, to the nature of law within the legal system itself, instead of within 
a broader context, and how one should interpret written law. Philosophers studying law 
began to interpret law as a relationship between commands, sanctions and duties within 
society.  
An English Jurist named John Austin in the 1930’s posited the Hobbesian notions that 
law arises from the sovereign of society and that the sovereign’s law was almost non-
debatable: “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it 
be or not be is one inquiry; whether it be or not be conformable to an assumed standard is 
a different inquiry.11” Law is then seen as something severed from morality, from themis, 
and only explainable to the end (the sovereign, group in power, or fundamental 
principles) to which the law ultimately serves. Hence, the scales of justice became so torn 
apart that the scale that was used to measure one side against the other vanished. The 
only part left within the scale of justice was the pan for the object to be weighed—which 
was now not under the discretion of themis at all, but under a specific portion of dikē’. It 
could only weigh itself against itself. 
The origin of prior laws was of no concern to philosophers during this period – laws 
were simply valid from the strength of their precedence in jurisprudence. It became a 
self-sufficient and self-explaining system whose fault and existence was weighed against 																																																								11	Bix, Brian. "John Austin." Stanford University. Stanford University, 24 Feb. 2001. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 	
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itself, with coercion and duty propagating such. The system of law defended itself 
through fear of punishment and through the notions that it is one’s duty to follow laws to 
maintain social order. Thus, a heightened focus on the interpretation of law, on the text of 
such, reasonably arose. For, if the existence and purpose of law was something to take for 
granted, the only debatable ground within law is the text composing such—here the types 
of judicial interpretation of original intent, literalism, and doctrinal approach arose.12 
The perspective that arose during the modern age in opposition to the more textual 
based version of law cried to revive the concept of morality—of themis—within law. 
Theorists took the previous principles arising from the ages and recognized that law is 
largely a social phenomenon, that, without the populous’ internal adherence to the 
principles of such, diminishes the aim of law to keep society under control.13 They 
recognized that the scales of justice cannot perform its duty without a fulcrum—a 
principle—to hold the pans in which objects are weighted. In using such rational as a 
guise to focus on the existence of morality in law, theorists began postulating the “certain 
conditions which a legal system must fulfill if it is to be minimally efficient in achieving 
the orderly regulation of social life.14” When such was attempted, it became understood 
that there was an “internal morality of law” (coined by Lon Fuller)—an overarching 
principle—which must be connected with minimal notions of justice to determine the 
principal conditions for a legal system. 
																																																								12	Senat, Joey. "Methods of Judicial Interpretation." Methods of Judicial Interpretation. Oklahoma State 
University, 21 June 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 13	Wiener. Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Vol. III. at 2.  14	Id.	
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In this perspective, law became a means with a purpose for a greater end. The 
relationship between dikē’ and themis in constructing the scales of justice emerged once 
more. Law was not viewed as merely text and expensive rhetoric in courtrooms – it 
became purposeful for the betterment and alignment of society with justice and morals. 
For example, Myers McDougal posits that law is a means to social change –laden with 
justice and morality – to an end supported by morality and justice.16 Just as the opposing 
perspective within modern times coined judicial perspectives of interpretations, this type 
of perspective did as well. One such perspective highlighted by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes was to interpret the “findings of a case, and [have] the further creative role in 
choosing between competing rules and principles for application.17” Judicial decisions 
were not meant to arise from just legal text but also from the moral and social contexts of 
society. Several other types of interpretations that arose from this train of thought were 
balancing competing interests (or eventualities) and a structuralist point of view that 
magnified decisions to the context of society.18  
As evidenced, the perspective of law has oscillated drastically to and from morality 
and justice. The relationship of dikē’ and themis that characterizing the beginning of law, 
slowly dissipated into the pieces of the scales of justice, hyper-focusing on these parts of 
dikē’. Now, it appears that the “contemporary studies of legal reasoning hold…some 																																																								15	Paton, Stephanie. "The 'Inner Morality of Law': An Analysis of Lon L. Fuller's Theory." The 'Inner 
Morality of Law': An Analysis of Lon L. Fuller's Theory. The GULS Law Review, 29 Oct. 2014. Web. 17 
Dec. 2015. 	16	McDougal, Myres S., "Law and Power" (1952). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2476. 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2476 17	Wiener. Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Vol. III. at 3.  18	See Senat, Joey. "Methods of Judicial Interpretation." 	
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promise of bridging the ancient division between positivist and natural law traditions19” – 
this point in history is pivotal to determining whether or not morality and justice can be 
incorporated back into the law. The mere cold and calculated text of the law has no 
sensitivity for the human condition when compared to what objective, moral-laden 
judicial insight can do. It is within analyzing current judicial thought, and determining the 
qualities of such that are beneficial to heightening the perspectives of justice and 
morality, that we may be able to rejuvenate our legal system to be a semblance of what its 
main purpose was – to both better individual and society. Hence, judicial decisions to a 
hypothetical fact pattern are analyzed to see what trends of thought are prevalent, and 
what implications this may have on society.  
THE BASIS 
 The hypothetical case utilized in this research is based on two recent Illinois 
Appellate Court decisions that display dichotomy in legal perspective seen in modern-day 
thought. 
People v. McDaniel, 2012 IL App (5th) 100575  
 
  The Defendant entered a Wal-Mart store wearing sunglasses, a heavy coat, and a 
ski cap, though it was not very cold outside.20 This raised the suspicion of the store’s loss 
prevention agent, who then followed the Defendant through the store, while also 
informing the store’s video surveillance system to monitor him. The agent then witnessed 
the Defendant pick up three fishing reels, valued at $181.00, and walk out of the store.21 
The video surveillance shows the Defendant was in the store for six minutes. The 																																																								19	Wiener. Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Vol. III. at 6.  	20	People v. McDaniel, 2012 IL App (5th) 100575, ¶ 3. 21	Id at ¶4. 
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Defendant was originally convicted of the more serious crime of burglary instead of the 
less severe crime of retail theft.  However, on appeal, the McDaniel court determined 
through analysis that the Defendant ultimately “did not ‘remain within’ in order to 
commit a theft.22 He entered with authority and did not exceed the physical scope of his 
authority left immediately after stealing the fishing reels. Defendant was properly 
convicted of that theft.23” The court duly noted that the difference in penalties was severe 
enough to negatively reshape public policy.24   
People v. Bradford, 2014 IL App (4th) 130288  
 An asset-protection associate was watching the Defendant as he walked into a 
Wal-Mart store, grabbed two DVDs from the display, and performed a “no receipt 
return,” for which he received a gift card in the amount of the DVD’s returned.25 The 
Defendant then produced a Wal-Mart plastic bag from his person and placed the shoes he 
selected off the aisle into the bag.26 The Defendant then paid for an unknown male’s 
items, did not offer to pay for any of his concealed items, and left the store.27 He was then 
charged and convicted with burglary. On appeal, the Bradford court rationalized the 
Defendant’s conviction, noting that a “defendant remaining within a building open to the 
public is ‘without authority’ if it is accompanied by an intent to steal.28” The court further 
asserted that the once the Defendant conceptualized the intent to steal, any authority to 
remain within the store was withdrawn.29   
																																																								22	Id at ¶12.	23	Id at ¶14.	24	Id at ¶19.	25	People v. Bradford, 2014 IL App (4th) 130288, ¶ 3. 
26 Id. 
27 Id at ¶4.  
28 Id at ¶33. 
29	Id at ¶28.	
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The Issue at Bar 
When comparing the Bradford case to the McDaniel case, it is important to note 
that the Bradford decision largely came without judicial precedence—previous court 
decisions had not interpreted the burglary statute to encompass what was previously 
defined as a retail theft. The shocking factor within such a decision is not only that an 
individual would be convicted of burglary for taking items worth less than what would 
qualify as grand theft, but the charge of burglary necessitates a sentence that can range 
from three to seven years in length (probation is technically possible in some 
circumstances but, even if imposed, the defendant would still have a lifelong felony 
conviction). This implication of such a conviction was a factor the McDaniel court 
acknowledged when they affirmed the Circuit court’s decision to not convict the 
defendant of burglary.  
Given the different perspectives evidenced in the Bradford case and the McDaniel 
case, questions about the legal system are sparked—if the man went before a different 
judge, would the sentence have been different, or would a different legal perspective have 
been used? Furthermore, what type of system do we have in place if a judge can 
somewhat arbitrarily sentence an individual of a crime based on their perspective of 
justice? In extrapolating the situations from the two cases and asking judges to determine 
whether or not they would convict this individual and why, the impact of a judge’s 
perspective can be evidenced. It is this perspective, and determining where such is 
historically derived from, that perhaps jurisprudence can be monitored in a way that can 
grant individuals equal weight in their opportunities to justice.   
THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE 
	 12	
Security cameras show a disheveled, middle-age man entering the Chicago K-
Mart store on 18th Street during the prime hours of the work day. Skeptical eyes survey 
him as he walks down the isles until he stops. Though the children’s aisle is small, it 
appears that he knows where he is going – to the shoes, children’s shoes. Cameras focus 
on him cautiously unfolding what is later confirmed to be a K-Mart bag. He picks up the 
pink, light-up shoes and puts them in the bag and back into the left pocket of his jacket. 
Michael Guevara was caught an hour later by the Chicago Police Department with 
witnesses confirming that this was the man seen in the K-Mart store.  
 Upon review of his criminal file, it was found that Guevara was convicted of 
driving under the influence in 2000 when he was twenty-two years old. Eleven years 
later, he was convicted of possessing cannabis, for which he served 12 months of 
probation. He then failed his probationary year for a retail theft ordinance violation and 
for not paying fines. No other significant findings were found within the file; however, 
given the witnesses, the surveillance video and previous history, the prosecutor decided 
to charge Mr. Guevera with burglary, a class 2 felony. It is important to note: the 
repercussions a felony can have on one’s record include the following: loss of the right to  
(1) become an elector, (2) hold/run for public office, (3) perform jury duty, (4) legally 
own a firearm; and (4) have a professional license.30 
PROCEDURE 
 To begin this study, a list of all the circuit judges in the State of Illinois was 
compiled and approximately fifty judges were randomly selected through an online 
generator as the study pool A hypothetical situation was then drafted that incorporated 																																																								30	Reinhart, Christopher. "Consequences of a Felony Conviction." Consequences of a Felony Conviction. 
CGA, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. <https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-r-0333.htm>. 	
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the  facts of the hypothetical case examined in the previous section.  Based on the 
conflicting rulings of the Bradford and McDaniels cases, there are disputable points 
regarding the application of convicting the offender of burglary under a statutory 
definition of a crime. After reviewing the fact pattern, the judges were then questioned as 
to whether or not  s/he would convict the defendant  of burglary. Following the fact 
pattern and the questions regarding the judge’s subsequent decision, a brief background 
survey was attached which addressed the personal qualities of the judges (i.e. gender, 
experience, age, relationship status, etc.). The documents were then mailed to the 
randomly selected judges with directions and a self-addressed, postage-paid envelope for 
the documents to be returned. A three-week period was allotted for the judges to return 
the documents.  
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The amount of responses received were approximately 18% of the total amount of 
individuals contacted, correlating with the expected response rate for a random external 
survey (on average random external surveys have a response rate of 10-15%31). The 
portion of individuals who responded to the survey were mostly white men, excluding 
two women and one Hispanic male, with variances in age and experience as a judge. As 
indicated in the surveys, the ages of the judges fell within two groups: (1) between 41 and 
60 years of age, and (2) between 61 and 80 years of age. More variance was present 
within the amount of judicial experience reported, for the levels of judicial experience 
were recorded as existing between the following spans of years: 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 
11-15 years, 16-20 years, and 26-30 years. All of the responding individuals were 																																																								31	Fryrear, Andrea. "Survey Response Rates." SurveyGizmo. N.p., 27 July 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 
<https://www.surveygizmo.com/survey-blog/survey-response-rates/>. 	
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married, and almost all had children, save one individual. The population sizes of the 
towns the survey pool was raised in did not appear to correlate with the decision the 
judges made, as shown in the chart below.		
 
 
Nevertheless, a correlation appeared between the age of the judge and the 
decision made—the younger judges in the age range of 40 to 60 years were more likely to 
convict the Defendant of burglary than the older judges in the age range of 61 to 80 years 
of age:		
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Figure	1:	As shown, there is no true correlation between the population size and the verdict in the matter.	
	 15	
 
 
Similar to the correlation between the ages of the judges and their subsequent 
verdicts, a correlation existed between the amount (in years) of job experience of the 
judges and the verdict they chose. The correlation was almost similar in that the more 
years of experience a judge had, the more likely the judge was going to determine the 
Defendant not guilty. The correlation is depicted in the chart below: 
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Figure	3:	Within the figure above, the correlation between judicial experience and verdict is displayed. (Note, 
however, the outlier response from a judge who did not choose a verdict is not included.)		
Figure	2:	Within the figure above, the correlation between verdict and age is displayed. (Note, however, the 
outlier response from a judge who did not choose a verdict is not included.)	
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As the guilty/non-guilty determination seemed to correlate with the age and 
experience of the judges, the rationale processes accompanying the verdict seemed to 
correlate as well with these characteristics. The written responses that affirmed the guilt 
of the hypothetical perpetrator appeared to be laden with more reasoning than the 
responses of those who denied that the perpetrator was guilty of burglary. The longer 
length of reasoning within those that convicted Guevara with burglary did not necessarily 
mean their arguments were more thorough in the analysis of the fact pattern. In fact, the 
reasoning appeared to be more indicative of an illogical justification than a description of 
rationale.  
When interpreting the analysis of the judges, regardless if they deemed Guevara 
guilty or not-guilty, the rules of law—though not the only factors when passing 
judgment—are important to note and are displayed in the chart below with the 
corresponding sentence: 
RETAIL 
THEFT 
(CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR) 
720 ILCS 
5/16-25(a)(1) 
A person commits retail theft when he or she knowingly: 
takes possession of, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred any merchandise displayed, held, 
stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establish with 
the intention of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying 
the full retail value of such merchandise. 
SENTENCING 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) 
For a Class A Misdemeanor: the sentence of imprisonment 
shall be a determinate sentence of less than one year. 
BURGLARY 
(CLASS 2 
FELONY) 
720 ILCS 
5/19-1(a) 
A person commits burglary when without authority he or she 
knowingly enters or without authority remains within a 
building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, 
railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein 
a felony or theft. 
SENTENCING 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) 
For a Class 2 felony: The sentence of imprisonment shall be a 
determinate sentence of not less than 3 years and not more 
than 7 years.  
All of the judges who convicted Guevara stated that, as the Bradford court 
determined, the actions he committed fall into the legal definition of a burglary; some 
	 17	
examples of the rationale include that “the fact pattern is technically a burglary, and the 
state can charge it as a burglary” and “rules of law say he is guilty of burglary…his 
conduct fits the burglary definition.” Though the judges state that Guevara committed 
what they deem to technically have been a burglary, almost all of the judges had some 
type of contradiction within their rationale. Their reasoning stated that: “I have never 
seen a prosecutor charge it in such a case…I might think the charge is overkill” and that 
it is “closer to retail theft than burglary.” Within these assertions, there is a stretch of 
judgment—as there was within the Bradford case. In Bradford, the definitions of entry 
and authority were weighed against residential burglaries—burglary matters in private 
premises, instead of those in public premises:  
“We find further support for our conclusion in People v. Dillavou, 2011 IL App (2d) 
091194, 958 N.E.2d 1118. In Dillavou, the defendant was convicted of residential 
burglary for stealing a camera from inside a house where he was performing work. The 
Second District Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the residential 
burglary statute requires proof that a defendant’s authority to be in the home of another 
person was expressly withdrawn before he may be convicted of residential burglary by 
unlawfully remaining. Id. ¶ 16, 958 N.E.2d 1118. The court noted the clear and 
unambiguous language of the residential burglary statute indicated a defendant is guilty 
of residential burglary if, while inside a house in which he has the authority to be, he 
forms the intent to commit a theft therein. Id. ¶ 12, 958 N.E.2d 1118. Thus, according to 
the court in Dillavou, a defendant’s authority to be in another person’s home “is 
implicitly withdrawn when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime.” (Emphasis 
in original.) Id. ¶ 16, 958 N.E.2d 1118. ¶ 30 Burglary is a lesser-included offense of 
residential burglary (see 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2010)). Extending the Dillavou 
court’s analysis vis-à-vis the residential burglary statute to the burglary statute here, a 
defendant’s authority to be in a public building is implicitly withdrawn once the 
defendant develops an intent to commit a felony or theft. In other words, the authority to 
remain in a public building, or any part of the public building, extends only to persons 
who remain in the building for a purpose consistent with the reason the building is 
open.32” (emphasis added) 
 
However, the court duly noted that the Weaver court referenced in their rationale 
utilizes a statement that undermines their entire conclusion “A criminal intent formulated 																																																								32	People v. Bradford at ¶ 29.	
	 18	
after a lawful entry will not satisfy the [burglary] statute.33” In both instances, judges 
overseeing the matters depend on the text, on a portion of dikē’ for their rationale; 
however, when the text is applied to the instance of the crime, an analytical eye finds 
fault within the connection. In Bradford, the court relied largely on the “clear and 
unambiguous language” of the residential burglary statute to bridge the ambiguity within 
the burglary statute regarding the authority to enter a building.34 This text of the 
unconnected, residential burglary statute seemingly overrides what was said in previous 
cases, as in Weaver, about how intent does not change one’s status of entry.  
Though there was a sense of unnamed doubt within their rationale, it is interesting 
that the judges in both the Bradford case and the hypothetic continue to assert that the 
defendants should be convicted with class 2 felonies. The question arises as to why a 
judge would decide to convict someone with a felony, when they themselves admit that 
such charge is “overkill”?  
The textual ineffectual reasoning within the rationale of those convicting the 
individual is shown—it is to the text that Guevara’s actions are compared to instead of 
their context within society. Simply put, the focus is on a portion of the scales of justice 
instead of the whole. As the outlier judge, whose rationale did not pose doubt as the 
other’s did, stated: “carrying the plastic bags into the store and using them for no other 
reason but to put the shoes in would indicate an intent to steal prior to entry;” hence, the 
intent element was hypothetically met.  The two elements of burglary ([1]an unauthorized 
individual entering a store and [2] an individual committing theft with intent) were (what 
they deem to be) fulfilled. The effect of such a conviction did not seem to be weighed 																																																								33	Id at ¶ 31. 	34	Id at ¶ 29.	
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against the impact such would have in society, against a family, even though the presence 
of one was acknowledged--“stealing children’s shoes suggests acting out of perceived 
need.” Though the charge would indeed be an overcharge, as three out of four of the 
judge’s state, it seems as though said charge did not outweigh the ruling of the text. Why 
does the authority of the text seemingly outweigh the context of an individual’s life? 
Wouldn’t these judges have discretion to not convict the defendant of burglary—
particularly, when the application of the text itself is somewhat ambiguous? 
This type of reasoning relies upon itself as a truth within itself—it is the text of 
the law that becomes the fundamental truth to which situations are applied and judged. In 
the case of the burglary matter, the individuals were not presumed innocent of burglary 
outright. They, along with their actions, were taken separately and put into an equation—
the prongs of a test—within which the output would be the crime of burglary if the 
actions were malleable into filling the criterion of such. The perspective these judges 
used show that it is not feasible the text could be inapplicable or even vague in terms of 
applying such to a situation. The irrationality of this perspective is shown in that 
situations become the malleable ambiguity, the “x” factor, subject to change within an 
equation.  
Just as dikē’ was conceived for a purpose, for the means to which its mother—
themis—serves, society created laws to manage and aid society itself. However, 
ineffectual textual reading of statutes has led to the value of adhering to the law not for 
the sake upholding societal values but merely for the sake of upholding a black and white 
reading of the law. Accordingly, punishment instead of rehabilitation becomes the 
ultimate outcome of justice. Is it not better to undercharge an individual whose crime was 
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not to the degree of another’s—as “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one 
innocent suffer.35”?  
One of the more poignant sentences within the rationale of a judge who convicted 
Guevara that is in tune with this matter is: “The truth is, the case is overcharged and 
should be a misdemeanor but that is not up to the court.”  It is a tactic of prosecutors to 
overcharge cases to incite individuals to give in to plea bargains that are more in tune 
with the charge one should realistically be charged with.36 Regardless, even though a case 
is “overcharged,” it is up to the discretion and professional opinion of the judge to discern 
between the facts and decide beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is guilty of a 
crime that is charged. The judge acknowledged that the facts of the matter align with the 
textual definition of a burglary, but an element of doubt existed as to whether the text 
aligned with the intent of the law. The callous application of applying the definition of 
burglary in this hypothetical case is a perfect example of the problem of solely judging 
cases based a superficial reading of the text without considering the purpose of the law. 
As the McDaniel court noted:  
“The State knows that [defendant] was truly ‘stealing’, rather than committing a burglary. 
The defense acknowledged at trial that shoplifting was what [defendant] was doing. *** 
In reality, the approach taken by the State in this prosecution, and in this appeal, will 
serve to convert every retail theft into a burglary. 
Ordinary burglary is a Class 2 felony punishable by three to seven years in prison. 
720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 2012) [sic]; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2012) [sic]. Standard 
retail theft of the type occurring in this case (theft not from the person, under $500) is a 
Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in jail. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West 
2012) [sic]; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) (West 2012) [sic]. The difference in potential 
penalties is severe. Whether or not it is good public policy to convert potentially all retail 
theft prosecutions into more serious ones for burglary is a matter of speculation. Whether 
good or bad though, that decision does not rest with the police, prosecutors, or even the 																																																								35	"Words of Justice." Words of Justice. Harvard Law School Library, n.d. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. 
<http://library.law.harvard.edu/justicequotes/explore-the-room/south-4/>. 36	"Why Prosecutors Overcharge." National Center for Due Process, 12 July 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 
<https://nationalcdp.org/why-prosecutors-overcharge/>. 
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courts of this state. The legislature defines what actions constitute a crime and how the 
crime should be punished. People	v.	Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145 (1995). If the police and 
prosecutors of Illinois believe that harsher penalties should be available to punish retail 
theft, they should put the issue before the legislature and seek change in the laws through 
legislative amendment. This [c]ourt should not assist the prosecution in creating a de	
facto	amendment to the criminal law by reading ‘remaining within’ so broadly that 
common shoplifting becomes burglary.37” 
 
The judges whose judicial decision was not to convict Guevara with burglary did 
not have as much rationale besides that the fact pattern did not fit the charge. Most 
interpreted the matter in that Guevara entered the store with authority.  One judge, akin to 
what was stated in the McDaniel case, stated that he has never seen a matter, similar to 
Guevara’s, that had been charged in this way—implying the absurdity of such a charge in 
said situation, and the implications it would cause on society if similar situations were 
charged as felonies. In all, it is vague and unclear whether other factors, such as the 
amount of the item that was taken, the authority, or intent, were subsequent factors in 
their end decisions.   
One judge in particular outlined the legal reasoning behind why he chose what he 
did: he used the public as a backdrop within which to judge the case, stating that “the 
public is invited to enter the store” and further that said “permission was not revoked.”  
He used the context of society to judge Guevara’s place within society—following a 
perspective like a Roman Era perspective to influence his decision, for it is from society 
and for society where laws arise. Just as the McDaniel court posited, it is against the 
backdrop of society that judicial decisions need to determined—the effect of these 
decisions needs to be weighed on the greater scale of thesmos. The judge did not solely 
																																																								37	People v. McDaniel at ¶ 34.	
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weigh Guevara’s decision against the text of the law that applied to the charge, but to the 
greater picture that encompassed such.  
The outlier response was the judge who essentially recused himself, stating that 
he did not review cases within the scope of the research presented. Not only did said 
judge take the time to send such response back, but the judge knowingly reported his lack 
of knowledge toward the subject that would hypothetically be presided over in this 
matter. The circuit judges were notably chosen at random— the areas of law they 
regularly overheard was not a factor within the selection. Though their presiding areas of 
law were not a question within the background survey, such would have been an 
interesting point to include. When presiding over Guevara’s case, did any of the other 
judges reflect upon their experience and use such within their determinations? The fact 
that this judge recused himself is impactful because in the interests of the proper 
administration of justice he morally determined that he was not suited to overhear the 
matter. That is the moral perspective highlighted and juxtaposed to the text-dependent  
perspective.  
The correlation between age, experience, and the verdict of a judge seems to 
signify differing types of thought between younger, less experienced judges, and those 
judges who are superior in age and experience with the law. The facts that those who 
were more likely to convict Guevara wanted to do so based on the text of the law and that 
they were also younger, perhaps suggests change in the administration of education in 
law schools. Another possibility for the noticeable correlation between age/experience 
and verdict is that w with increasing experience and age, judges gain a wizened 
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perspective composed of themis that extends beyond the words of the statute, beyond 
dikē’. 
 Does it take experience and age in the judicial perspective for judges to have a 
more moral laden perspective? Does it take such perspective to understand the 
shortcomings of relying only on text when determining the fate of someone against the 
law? Though open ended questions, perhaps a larger sample size of a more isolated 
portion (focusing only on judges who have had experience in criminal court) would bring 
results more supportive of a definitive answer to such questions. If such were performed, 
this data could be extrapolated into a perspective that could be used to aid “new” judges 
from focusing too much on the text of the law (as indicated within this study) equalizing 
opportunities of those who stand before judges, awaiting their judgment.  
CONCLUSION 
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Figure	4:	Within the figure above, the correlation between age, judicial experience and verdict is 
displayed. (Note, however, the outlier response from a judge who did not choose a verdict is not 
included.)		
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In sum, the perspectives shown within the judicial rationale of the judges 
hypothetically overseeing the case of Guevara displays the divide within the evolution of 
legal thought. This divide is not only evident through the results collected, but also within 
recent judicial decisions that display the textual-focused and moralistic dichotomy of 
perspectives within legal thought. Through analyzing the history of law, it is evident that 
the moral perspective in applying justice has, to some judges, become secondary to 
adhering to the textual underpinnings of statutes. 
The scales of justice that were once a union between dikē’ and themis, have 
disintegrated into mutually exclusive pieces for some judges – with their sole focus on 
the parts that compose dikē’. As the law became less focused on the end of improving the 
individual and society, it became hyper-focused on these means by which the law is 
carried out – text, punishments, and oversight. . In a matter of time, the means were 
mistaken for the end for which law served, resulting in the textual-based reasoning 
evidenced in the hypothetical conviction of Guevara and the actual conviction of the 
Bradford Defendant.  
An analysis of the textual-based logic displays outright contradiction to the 
beginnings of law and the purpose for which law served. As displayed within the 
hypothetical case and the Bradford case, a situation within this perspective becomes 
something to be manipulated to fit into the rigid definitions of a statute. The context of 
the situation, the backdrop of society, and the implications of a judgment do not hold 
weight within the Bradford perspective. Within the McDaniel perspective, the moral 
implication of the decision to convict or to not convict is evidenced, accompanied by a 
critical analysis of the applicability of the burglary statute to the particular fact pattern.   
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The results wrought from this study, accompanied by the conflicting judicial 
decisions within Illinois, demand for a recalibration of the justice system in the form of 
further study and analysis of the perspectives of jurisprudence, for it is truly within the 
hands of judges that justice plays out as they are the dikaspoloi --‘handlers of dikē’. In 
deconstructing the perspectives that have emerged historically within the field of law and 
applying such to modern-day jurisprudence, perhaps the dichotomy that has emerged may 
be bridged with a perspective that is more multi-faceted and empathetic to both 
personhood and the public. The scales of justice can be reassembled yet again be held by 
Dike for the purpose of Themis.  
 
  
